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The goal this project was to develop a system that would be capable of supplying
application layer context of one host for the network layer traces collected by a second
independent host. The aim of the resulted system, based on the principle of decoys, would
be to analyze potentially malicious traffic without a threat to production services.
The practical part of this work involved building a scalable setup to verify the feasibility
of the chosen methods. The study concentrated primarily on the Linux Slapper worm and
used a sample of the worm’s exploit code to develop a mechanism for attracting a worm
and creating a signature suitable for the worm identification by an IDS system. The key
outcomes of the project included establishing the honeynet environment for inspecting
malicious traffic flows and examining the worm functionality. The work also reflected on
the body of knowledge presently available by studying the different solutions in the field
of malware analysis.
The developed system has no production value, but provides an outlook into functioning
and interfaces between various technologies that usually operate independently. Further
study could include examination of low-level components and assumptions made by
software developers and malware authors. Additional work on formalizing the properties
and modelling worm interaction could also assist in improving the understanding of
malicious code.
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shellcode, sebek
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Abbreviations
API Application Programming Interface
ASCII American Standard Code for Information Interchange
BOOTP Bootstrap Protocol
CPU Central Processing Unit
DLL Dynamic-link Library
DomU Unpriveleged Domain in Xen
DoS Denial of Service
ELF Executable and Linkable Format
GCC GNU Compiler Collection
GOT Global Offset Table
GRE Generic Routing Encapsulation
GUI Graphical User Interface
HIDS Host-based Intrusion Detection System
HIH High Interaction Honeypot
HTTP Hypertext Transfer Protocol
HTTPS Hypertext Transfer Protocol Secure
HVM Hardware-assisted Virtualization
IDS Intrusion Detection System
IDT Interrupt Descriptor Table
I/O Input/Output
IP Internet Protocol
IPv6 Internet Protocol version 6
LIH Low-interaction Honeypot
MAC Media Access Control
NAT Network Address Translation
NIC Network Interface Controller
NIDS Network-based Intrusion Detection System
OS Operating System
OUI Organizationally Unique Identifier
P2P Peer-to-peer
PCAP Packet Capture
SELinux Security-Enhanced Linux
SSL/TLS Secure Sockets Layer / Transport Layer Security
TCP Transmission Control Protocol
TFTP Trivial File Transfer Protocol
UDP User Datagram Protocol
UML User-mode Linux
VM Virtual Machine
VMM Virtual Machine Monitor
61  Introduction
The goal of this project is to study an automated system for examining malicious
activity and creating network Intrusion Detection System (IDS) signatures. The purpose
is to obtain a generic solution with flexibility of an anomaly-based IDS and
effectiveness of a signature-based IDS. Automation is also an important goal, because
attempting to produce more autonomous IDS systems results in gaining better
understanding and facilitating the manual process of signature creation.
The focus of this study is on autonomously spreading malware or worms that typically
present a challenge for effective identification and containment due to high propagation
rates. The major project objective is to compare the efficiency of signatures produced
by the constructed honeynet system, passively intercepting and processing malicious
flows, and those made by an IDS vendor. Producing sound security tools, requires
knowledge of how a potential attacker operates. Therefore in the course of my project I
will also consider the implementation of the relevant Apache exploit.
The scope of this project is limited to developing a system that is capable of
automatically performing the task of attracting and capturing malware. No heuristics or
machine learning is being implemented. The system is limited to working with
Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP) and HTTP Secure (HTTPS) protocols and a single
worm only. While limited in scope, my project contains a mix of independent
technologies, which, if made aware of one another, will be capable of greater precision
and lower cost at identifying malicious patterns.
72  Previous Studies on Honeypots and IDS systems
2.1  Properties of Computer Worms
According to Mell, Kent and Nusbaum (2005) malware or malicious software is “a
program that is inserted into a system, usually covertly, with the intent of compromising
the confidentiality, integrity, or availability” [1].  Examples of malware include viruses,
worms, Trojan horses, backdoors and rootkits. Worms, and in particular network service
worms, are of most interest in this work. Worms being self-contained, self-replicating
and self-propagating malware pose a significant challenge, because human reaction is
too slow to prevent wide-spread infections.
For spreading over the Internet, worms use a variety of scanning techniques to locate
vulnerable hosts. The speed of a worm spreading depends on scanning methods used by
a worm. The well-known worm scanning methods include:
· random scanning: searching the entire address space
· routable scan: targeting only reachable subnets
· hit-list scanning: using a list of vulnerable hosts initially and random scanning
afterwards
· divide and conquer scan: avoiding re-scanning by dividing address ranges
between worm instances
· local preference scanning: hosts in the same locality are likely to have similar
vulnerabilities
Random scanning is simple, but highly inefficient, especially with Internet Protocol
version 6 (IPv6) deployments. Routable and hit-list scanning require a worm to carry
pre-compiled address ranges, increasing the size and limiting impact of the worm. The
divide and conquer scan is the first step at making worms coordinate their scanning
tactics. Local preference scanning is an example of the method using non-uniform
distribution of vulnerable hosts in a particular domain name, autonomous system or IP
8range. The more robust propagation can be achieved by worms with properties of
collective intelligence. An idea analysed by Yi and Xiangning (2006) shows how newly
created worms can communicate with a creator worm to modify their propagation
behaviour, analogous to ant colonies [2], which can be viewed as a type of divide and
conquer scan.
The work of Chuanyi and Chen (2005) on enhancing worm efficiency demonstrates
benefits of importance scanning, or reducing the number of worm probes based on
distribution of vulnerable hosts, for producing a worm that is able to modify its attack
patterns, based on distribution of vulnerable host population. The idea implies a need
for having a central location for collecting and computing probabilities, while at the
same time keeping a low level of information exchange. To get the host distribution the
worm first has to use random scanning, which can be slow with IPv6 addresses, but is
made more effective by applying importance scanning algorithms. Defences against
such worms consist of deploying applications uniformly, difficult due to inherent non-
uniform structure of the Internet, and information exchange between different network
domains, to stop the worm during learning stage. [3]
2.2  Honeypots and Related Technologies
2.2.1  Understanding Honeypots and Honeynets
A honeypot is a tool that is set up for the purpose of being attacked and compromised.
Since there is no production function for a honeypot, any interactions with the honeypot
usually indicate a malicious activity. Therefore, previously unknown attacks can be
discovered.
Honeypots exist in two distinct categories: high-interaction and low-interaction. Low-
interaction honeypots (LIH) use scripts to emulate Transmission Control Protocol
(TCP) based services. If services are emulated, there is no possibility of exploiting a
particular service, thus risks are minimized. LIH honeypots use fewer resources and are
9able to emulate complete network topologies. High-interaction honeypots (HIH) on the
other hand run vulnerable services without emulation. If a HIH honeypot is
compromised, an attacker will gain full access to the resources of a vulnerable machine.
Honeynets are research honeypots that are composed of HIH honeypots. Honeynets
evolved from being run on separate physical machines and presently make use of
virtualization. Two major requirements of the honeynet are data control and data
capture. Data control is offered by a Layer 2 device, honeywall, that monitors outgoing
and incoming traffic. The control of outgoing traffic can, for example, be performed by
using Snort-inline to overwrite harmful contents of an outgoing packet. However, this
relies on the fact that an IDS is already aware of the particular attack pattern. This is not
always true, since one goal of honeynets is to discover previously unknown attacks.
Data capture is performed at several layers: on the honeywall and on the HIH honeypot
host. The latter is needed, when an attacker is using encrypted tunneling for
communicating with the honeypot.
The definition of hybrid virtual honeypots has two meanings:
· honeynet setup with virtualized HIH honeypots and physical host running
honeywall
· honeynet combining virtualized honeywall, LIH and HIH honeypots.
During my work I made use of the second definition that includes different honeypot
types with all the components of the honeynet being virtualized. One of the main
arguments for running a honeywall on a separate physical host is additional security
gained for the honeywall, which is not affected by malicious activity on HIH honeypots.
However, exploits targeting virtualization layer are rare, and therefore it is safe to run a
completely virtualized honeynet.
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The honeypots are not necessarily passive monitoring devices. The development of
client-side honeypots resolves the issue of resource idleness and establishes a more
proactive approach to end-user security. Typical client honeypots exist in a form of an
emulated web browser that makes queries to various potentially malicious servers,
attempts to circumvent obfuscation techniques used by malware and execute the
resulting code to analyze the level of a threat. Examples of client honeypots are HoneyC
and Microsoft's closed-source Honeymonkey [4].
The challenges of server-side honeypots are distinct from those of client-side
honeypots. For example, server-side honeypots may create an illusion of a suspiciously
homogeneous environment. Another challenge is the stationary location of honeypot
systems. Thus a production server can still be compromised, without a honeypot being
notified. LaBrea honeypots take a different approach by occupying unused address
space and tarpitting or slowing down the spread of malware, a technique that can be
useful in defense against worms and spammers.
An important development in honeypotting technology is the ability of distributed
honeypots to communicate with each other and correlate information obtained from
different sensors, similarly to the operation of distributed IDS systems described in
section 2.3.3.
2.2.2  Present High-interaction Honeypots Models
Several approaches have been taken to study attacker's behaviour with HIH honeypots.
Yan (2005) used User-Mode Linux (UML) to provide virtualized environment for
controlled interaction with malware. The major advantage of using the UML is access
to monitoring of processes executed in a guest OS from a host OS and logging
keystrokes, which is extended with a file system imaging tool, capable of taking
snapshots of a guest OS for further examination. Security-Enhanced Linux (SELinux) is
also used to control processes executed inside a guest OS, relying on visibility of the
guest OS properties from a host OS. Yan (2005) also argues that visibility of UML-
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based virtualization in honeypots does not present a major threat, because of
virtualization becoming wide-spread. [5]
Briffaut, Lalande and Toinard (2009) do not make use of virtualization for capturing
malicious activities with HIH honeypots, instead a cluster of different physical hosts is
used. Although, different platforms are employing different logging standards, the study
highlights the benefits of correlating network and host activity in order to identify
effects of network traffic on recipient systems. Hosts based on SELinux proved to be
the most attack-resistant and did not need re-installation despite numerous exploits
being attempted, mainly because root-user privileges are limited by SELinux policies.
The whole system, however, needs to be operated manually, except for the automated
re-installation of infected hosts, using Bootstrap Protocol (BOOTP) and Trivial File
Transfer Protocol (TFTP). [6]
The intrusion detection framework by Artail, Safa and Sraj (2006) describes an adaptive
structure consisting of LIH and HIH honeypots. The work addresses the primary
limitation of many honeypot-based solutions, i.e. not following the distribution of OS
versions and services in the rest of the network. The proposed solution is highly scalable
as it makes use of the unoccupied Internet Protocol (IP) addresses for LIH honeypots
that redirect traffic to HIH honeypots. The work of Artail, Safa and Sraj (2006) stresses
that the availability of a large number of IP addresses is a key to effective honeypot-
based systems. Having created a distributed honeypot model, the framework does not
provide means for signature generation and is not capable of preventing ongoing
intrusions. Instead a site administrator is notified about malicious activity. [7]
2.2.3  Existing Honeynet Architectures
Performance and a need to obtain high fidelity attack information have driven the
development of large-scale hybrid honeynet architectures or honeyfarms. The idea of
traffic redirectors from an attacked host to a central analysis and correlation centre is
presented in Collapsar project by Xuxian, Dongyan and Yi-Min (2006). By means of
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centralizing the traffic analysis, the processing is offloaded from end-user systems.
However, challenges arise with identification of the traffic that needs redirection and
methods for traffic redirection. In Collapsar the proposed solutions consist of
application level redirectors or modifications to routing topology for suspicious traffic.
[8]
A further step in maximizing the number and efficiency of HIH honeypots is done with
the development of Potemkin honeyfarm by Vrable, Ma and Chen (2005).This
architecture is based on the principle of spawning a virtual machine only when a
particular type of activity is detected. Potemkin developers propose creating a reference
memory snapshot of a HIH honeypot to reduce startup time. A honeyfarm gateway is
then responsible for management of resources and containment. [9]
Unfortunately none of the scalable honeyfarms is available as an open-source
implementation, although some of the proposed solutions provide useful directions for
future developers. The Potemkin and Collapsar honeyfarms make use of Generic
Routing Encapsulation (GRE) tunnels to route potentially malicious traffic. Xen and
UML Linux are the primary virtualization platforms, due to modifications of a Virtual
Machine Monitor (VMM) needed to process requests from the honeyfarm gateway, as
well as extension of monitoring facilities.
While the proposed large scale solutions are potentially able to provide scalability, it is
unclear which traffic should be redirected to centralized HIH honeypots and how to
maintain images of virtual machines in case of long-term attacks. Another major
challenge is addressing the timing delay of sending potentially malicious traffic to a
honeyfarm and responding back to an attacker. Hiding the presence of a traffic
redirector is not a trivial task either.
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2.2.4  Summary of Virtualization Principles
At the heart of deploying a scalable honeypot solution lie the benefits provided by
virtualization. Virtualization is the ability of the physical server hardware to be shared
by several virtual machines. Among different virtulization methods only full-
virtualization and paravirtualization are feasible in the implementation of HIH
honeypots. The major benefits provided by these virtualization methods are resource
isolation and a possibility of restoring a virtual machine (VM) to a past reference image.
An example of a paravirtualized VMM is Xen [10]. Xen is able to effectively and
securely share available resources, while giving a guest VM an ability to see real
hardware resources. One of the added benefits is the increased speed of execution by
making a guest VM aware of virtualization layer, which involves modification of the
guest OS kernel, although no changes are needed for applications running in the
modified guest OS.
Full virtulazation allows running a guest OS unmodified and provides a set of generic
hardware devices to be accessed by the guest VM. In particular, using VMware ESX
provides full-virtualization support, also allowing to run a VMM without the underlying
host OS. Hardware independence of full virtualization solutions and portability of guest
VMs leads to wide spread deployment of such systems, particularly in connection with
closed-source applications and end-user systems.
Although virtualization is an important part of running enterprise-level services, x86
architecture was not designed to support virtualization. As a result of concurrently
running several virtual machines, there exist sensitive instructions that must not be
executed directly by a processor. Additionally, running guest VMs on a lower privilege
level than a VMM results in several privileged instructions needing emulation by the
VMM. However, the x86 instructions set contains several sensitive unprivileged
instructions, not emulated by the VMM. Thus a complete isolation of guest VMs is not
achieved. [11] Hardware assisted virtualization for x86-based processors have been
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developed with the introduction of Intel-VT and AMD-V. With hardware-assisted
virtualization a processor is using hardware extensions to emulate sensitive instructions.
The VMM creates a new attack surface, posing threats such as resource mapping and
insufficient fault isolation. Interestingly, virtualization technology by itself can also be
used by attackers. The BluePill project has developed a nested virtualization solution for
placing an attacker’s code into a VM, that is isolated from an attacked computer.
Although detection of an unauthorized virtualization layer can be performed, it is not
currently possible to detect the presence of BluePill. [12]
2.3  Intrusion Detection Systems
2.3.1  IDS Principles
To examine traffic passing through firewall rules and protect servers and end-user
systems from ever-present software bugs, intrusion detection systems (IDS) need to be
deployed in an enterprise network. IDS is defined as a mechanism to “detect violations
of system security policy” [13]. IDS systems are classified into a host- and network-
based IDS. The Host IDS (HIDS) is working by means of auditing a single host, while
the network IDS (NIDS) is monitoring network traffic flowing between hosts. The most
important features of an IDS include:
· running continuously without being supervised
· fault tolerance or ability to recover from crashes
· monitoring IDS consistency and self-checking against compromises
· adapting to changes in user and network behaviour
· graceful degradation or ability to continue working if some of the components
fail
· configurable to reflect needed security policies. [14]
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IDS systems are typically divided into anomaly-based and misuse-based systems. The
misuse IDS relies on existence of patterns or signatures matching malicious behaviour,
similar to signature based anti-virus products. Misuse IDS is not able to identify attacks
not matching a set of defined rules.
The anomaly IDS detects deviations from normal activity expressed in terms of network
flows, user profile or application use. Such an IDS can detect unknown attacks, given
that the normal activity estimate is accurate and the normal versus abnormal threshold is
able to adapt to changing user needs. Anomaly detection can be separated into static and
dynamic anomaly detection. A static anomaly detector relies on some constant property
of a system, for example, OS code, whereas a dynamic anomaly detector uses event
records and network traffic data. [13] Anomaly IDS systems are frequently based on
various machine learning techniques, such as pattern classification, single classifiers
and generic algorithms.
The output of an IDS, correctly identifying an attack is called a true positive, while
treating malicious activity as normal is called a false negative. A false positive occurs
when normal activity is seen as an attack, whereas a true negative correctly classifies
non-malicious activity. Detection rate and false alarm rate are some of the metrics used
to evaluate IDS performance:
positiveFalsenegativeTrue
positiveFalseratealarmFalse
negativeFalsepositiveTrue
postiveTruerateDetection
+
=
+
=
The Snort IDS is a misuse-based network IDS. The Snort IDS was chosen for this
project, because of being open-source, as well as extensible, and having a developed
community and documentation. Figure 1 illustrates the major components of the Snort
IDS.
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Figure 1. Snort IDS architecture. Reprinted from Writing Effective Rules, Part 1 (2008)
[15]
As can be seen from Figure 1, the first step of processing incoming packets is the packet
decoder. Packet decoders perform input data parsing to identify separate packets and
their fields: headers and payload. Preprocessors prepare packets for detection engine by
reassembling and normalizing packets, to represent data in a standardized manner. [15]
The detection engine and output formatting take care of Snort IDS rule matching and
result formatting.
2.3.2  HIDS Context to Aid Network Layer Visibility
A technique proposed by Rabek, Khazan and Lewandowski (2003) of using the static
analysis of executables to locate Win32 API calls and monitor the calls made to the API
during program runtime. Such an approach is effective against malware that is trying to
hide itself by means of injection, polymorphism or obfuscation, but cannot deal with
malware not using such techniques or cause false positives on software protection and
the legitimate use of dynamic API binding. This framework works in two stages:
preprocessing, to locate APIs and record return addresses, and validation, to verify an
instruction for an API and the return address. To successfully detect malicious activity,
the framework needs for malware to interact with Win32 API and not only exploit the
target software. [16]
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Combining views seen by HIDS and NIDS has been studied by Dreger, Kreibich and
Paxson (2005) for adding host context information to an IDS looking at traffic flows,
which would allow for a NIDS to analyze the exact protocol state of an end-host and
observe events over encrypted channels. The Bro IDS has been used for receiving
application specific events notifications from end-hosts and comparing the results seen
by an end-host with the ones ‘seen on the wire’.  The solution proved to have a good
response time and can even allow removing application level decoding from an NIDS,
but a challenge is in recording manipulations by an end-host upon receiving a client
request, such as URL-canonicalization.  [17]
2.3.3  Innovative Approaches to Intrusion Detection
Traditionally, IDS systems are deployed within the limits of a certain organization.
Hence there are presently no commercial solutions that would enable effective sharing
and correlation of alerts obtained from IDS systems located in different administrative
domains. This is one of the challenges addressed by the research by Locasto, Parekh
and Keromytis (2005) aimed at creating a distributed and collaborative IDS. In their
work Locasto, Parekh and Keromytis (2005) identify the reliability of information
sources for IDS alerts and integrity and confidentiality of exchanged data as challenges
to cross-organisational sharing of IDS alerts. Use of Bloom filters, one way hash-
functions, allowing only verification and insertion, is proposed to avoid leaks of
confidential information via alert exchanges. A distributed correlation function is being
used for correlating alerts from several sources to avoid having a single point of failure
with a centralized storage service. An important achievement of such a solution is the
ability to detect low-volume scanning, as well as wide reaching outbreaks. [18]
A different approach to cope with IDS visibility problems is discussed by Garfinkel and
Roseblum (2003), who demonstrate an implementation of VMM-based HIDS, allowing
better access control and isolation of an IDS from the  monitored host. An assumption is
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made that VMM is a relatively straightforward component and thus is not vulnerable to
compromises. To be effective, an IDS resides in a separate VM and monitors only
potentially hazardous calls to avoid performance penalties. Hence an attacker capable of
modifying, for example the interrupt dispatch table (IDT) will mislead an IDS about the
true state of the monitored system. By controlling access to sensitive memory areas an
IDT table can be secured, although several dynamic kernel structures in the memory
cannot be protected by a developed implementation. [19]
2.4  Automated Code Analysis
2.4.1  Analysis of Exploit Payload
A major drawback of automated analysis systems is that such systems study only a
single execution path and are not able to observe all conditions which can be seen by
means of the static analysis. This limitation had been addressed by the study of Moser,
Kruegel and Kirda (2007) on developing a system capable of detecting conditional
execution paths. The proposal includes the idea to dynamically track input values
requested by malware samples, to identify a code branch, to take a snapshot of a state
before the branch and to run the sample by selecting different condition inputs. [20]
CWSandox is one of the tools for dynamic malware analysis of malware samples.
CWSandox relies on Application Programming Interface (API) hooking, in-memory
overwriting of the call to Windows API with an address of a hook function, which will
perform a Dynamic-link Library (DLL) injection by directing the program flow to a
customized DLL code. [21] However, if malware is able to verify its own integrity or
the integrity of the supplied DLLs, or make use of its own DLLs, CWSandox will not
be able to detect such malware.
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2.4.2  Automated Worm Response
The study by Moore, Shannon and Voelker (2003) identifies prevention, treatment and
containment as properties that affect the number of hosts infected by a worm. By
following secure software development practices it is possible to minimize the
vulnerabilities present and slow down worm propagation. Treatment relates to the
amount of time needed for an analyst to identify a worm and produce a reliable
signature. Containment involves the actual measures taken to prevent worm spreading.
Estimated reaction time for defeating worms with content filtering is one to two hours
[22]. Major conclusions of the work by Moore, Shannon and Voelker (2003) are the
need for automated techniques of identification and response to worm spread and
content filtering up to the application layer to effectively filter out worm traffic.
Several properties for signatures generated to discover malicious activity have been
identified [23;24]. Signature quality depends on the ability of the signature to accurately
distinguish malicious and non-malicious activities. The signature number and length of
the needed pattern matching affects the performance and throughput of an IDS system.
Another property of IDS signatures is effectiveness against polymorphism, presently
based on the non-idealities of polymorphic generators, such as having identical worm
decryptor routines.  The timeliness of obtaining signatures and application
independence of the created signatures are also important properties of effective threat
mitigation.
Previous attempts to create a system to respond automatically to worm threats include
the development of Autograph [23], a system for automated signature generation for
TCP-based services, relying on identification of the most frequently occurring patterns
in a TCP flow sample to formulate worm signatures. Such an assumption is valid,
because while a worm is spreading, repeated byte patterns can be identified in an
affected network segment. Autograph limitations are a slow process of the TCP flow
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reassembly and inability to detect worms, using hit-list scanning and thus having a
minimal number of identical packets in network flows.
Earlybird does not rely on honeypots, but is detecting worms by identifying
characteristics inherent to worms, such as invariable strings across all the worm
instances and uniform distribution of network traffic from infected hosts [24]. Earlybird
is designed to generate signatures for NIDS, such as Snort and Bro, and has a
throughput of 200 Mbit/s, and is able to detect a wider range of worms by not using
traffic pre-classification, employed by Autograph. To reduce the number of false
positives, traffic matching signatures generated by Earlybird can be rate-limited and
monitoring continued to identify if a suspicious traffic reaches a threshold to be
identified as malicious. [24]
Honeycomb is a tool for automatic generation of signatures for NIDS by means of
pattern matching and protocol analysis, based on Honeyd [25]. Good IDS signatures
should be specific, while capturing variations of the same attack. By using the longest
common substring algorithm Honeycomb creates signatures, attempting to find matches
between honeypot and IDS traffic. [25]
Honeybow is one of the closely related projects with an aim of automatic collection of
autonomous malware [26]. Honeybow relies on monitoring network and file system
activity for detecting malware. Honeybow targets only Windows systems and makes
use of a tool for extracting PE executables, PE hunter, with Snort IDS from the network
stream. The main disadvantage of Honeybow is an easily detectable program for real
time monitoring of changes to a file system, a drawback which is reduced by analysis
tools existing outside of a honeypot. [26]
A step towards automated worm containment, as opposed to detection and prevention,
has been made by the Virus Throttle project, which exploits differences between normal
and malicious network activity of a usual end-user system [27]. The idea is based on
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keeping track of connections made by an end-user. Thus if a host is infected, it will
attempt to make high-rate connection attempts to new, previously unrequested
destinations. By means of analyzing code behaviour, instead of performing matching
with signatures, Virus Throttle can be effective in detecting zero-day attacks. Finally,
Virus Throttle reduces the risk of false positives, since a legitimate connection can only
be delayed, but not blocked. [27]
2.5  Attacks on IDS and Honeypot Systems
2.5.1 Defeating an IDS
An attacker has several ways to detect the presence of an IDS in a target network. For
example, reverse DNS queries on an attacker's IP address or scans launched by an attack
target mean that the IDS is collecting information for intrusion alert information. An
IDS/IPS system may also change firewall rules in response to a protected target being
scanned or probed. Some passive, not inline IDS systems, will forge RST packets,
which can be seen by looking at packet headers. [28]
Once an IDS is detected, a careful attacker will try to avoid being noticed. An easy
access to the rules published, for instance, by Sourcefire for Snort, makes it trivial for
an attacker to learn which features the Snort IDS is looking for. Techniques such as
slowing down the scanning, avoiding sequential scans of network ranges and packet
fragmentation are widely known IDS-avoidance tactics. Spoofing an attack source and
DNS proxying insure that an attacker's identity will remain unknown to a compromised
party. [28]
2.5.2  LIH Honeypot Reconnaissance
To detect an LIH honeypot, an adversary does not need to compromise the honeypot.
Observing inconsistencies in services being executed, such as Windows Server
application on a Linux host, noticing correlation between load on one LIH honeypot and
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response time of other seemingly unrelated machines are among the most trivial
honeypot detection techniques. Additionally, by crafting invalid packets or looking at
responses to fragmented packets it is also possible to detect emulated honeypot
environments. [29] By sending malformed SYN packets to older versions of Honeyd
and getting an RST response, it is possible to distinguish between a Honeyd host and a
real one.
2.5.3  High-interaction Honeypot Discovery
Honeypot technology benefits that make honeypots a fruitful resource for network
defenders can also be used by attackers to detect monitored environments. The detection
tools can be as generic as measuring timing of malware execution and debugger
detection to sophisticated honeypot-specific techniques. By creating hitlists with
honeypot addresses, noticing configuration differences between production systems and
honeypots, and observing that honeypot technologies are mostly used for servers, an
attacker is able to pinpoint and avoid honeypots.
Virtualization is invaluable for implementing honeypots that are not used in production,
but can be easily spotted. For example, VMware can be detected by looking at the
VMware-specific names of network and audio cards, Windows registry or SCSI/IDE
devices. Additionally, by obtaining the Organizationally Unique Identifier (OUI) of a
Media Access Control (MAC) address it is trivial to trace a VMware network interface
card (NIC). Moreover, VMware has an I/O-backdoor allowing to manipulate the virtual
machine clipboard and get information on the VMware version, the contents of a
clipboard or CPU frequency. [30] To make use of these VMware features, an attacker
will need to load a known magic number into the EAX register and pass call parameters
in EBX and ECX [31].
The Sebek covert monitoring, based on a principle of Linux kernel module rootkits
overwriting system calls for reading or opening files and creating network sockets, can
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be detected relatively easily.  There are several techniques to identify the presence of
Sebek. Since Sebek relies on the method of covertly sending User Datagram Protocol
(UDP) packets over the network, by causing multiple calls to the read() syscall, it is
possible to create network congestion and a delay detectable with a ping command.
Also by comparing the number of transmitted packets seen with different methods on
Linux systems and examining the memory for Sebek structures, the Sebek presence can
be identified. Since Sebek needs to modify the read() syscall, by checking the location
of write() and read() syscalls in the memory one is able to see an abnormally large
distance between the two, indicating Sebek module being loaded. The tool, Kebes,
developed by Holz, Dornseif and Klei (2004) allows an attacker to establish an
encrypted tunnel and avoid the use of monitored Sebek read() syscall completely. [32]
The detection of a honeywall, running Snort-inline in front of HIH honeypots, is done
by observing restrictions on traffic originated from the honeypots and packet rewriting
performed to sanitize malicious content originated from a honeynet.
2.5.4  Addressing Delectability Issues
The visibility of honeypot techniques is one of the major challenges addressed in
several studies. Research done by Song and Takakura (2008) proposes a method for
intelligent port opening to protect from the discovery of honeypots based on low-
interaction Nepenthes, by default listening on all ports for observing attacker's activities
[33]. A study conducted by Khattab, Sangpachatanaruk and Mosse (2004) makes an
attempt to hide honeypots in a pool of legitimate servers, proposing a mechanism of
notifying legitimate clients to switch from one server to another. By means of such a
method, attack traffic can be either reactively directed to honeypots or proactive
measures can be taken to prevent unknown attacks. This solution, however, poses an
overhead, acknowledged by Khattab, Sangpachatanaruk and Mosse (2004), of having
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clients to reestablish active TCP connections and reduction in available server
processing resources, caused by introduction of honeypots in a server spool. [34]
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3  Honeynet Development and Worm Analysis
3.1  Project Context
The system for automated capture and analysis of autonomous malware was set up in
the networking laboratory of the Helsinki Metropolia University of Applied Sciences,
Espoo, Finland.  This work is a result of part-time activity over a period of eight
months, while learning the essential skills of system administration and getting hold of
the basic concepts in malware research. This project relies on freely available material
found on the Internet, research done by the different chapters of the Honeynet project
and relevant mailing lists. My contribution with the present project is collecting all the
needed information and reflecting on the available solutions to build my honeynet
system.
3.2  Honeynet Design
Figure 2 illustrates the complete honeynet setup as seen from a high level. The honeynet
was run on the VMware ESX server, with the virtual switch being a part of the VMware
ESX server.
Figure 2. Overview of honeynet setup
Low-
interaction
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High-
interaction
honeypot
Virtual switch
Honeynet
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Untrusted network
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The honeynet consists of the following components:
· honeynet gateway with signature generation script
· LIH honeypot
· HIH honeypot
The honeynet gateway was responsible for making decisions on attack traffic
redirection between LIH and HIH honeypots. The signature generation script processed
traffic dumps of captured honeynet sessions, analyzed information from HIH honeypots
and extracted relevant packets from the traffic dump to be placed in a signature.
The LIH honeypot was the front-end of the honeynet setup. Every connection was
established to the LIH honeypot at first, thus allowing to select only unique packets for
sending to HIH honeypots. The LIH honeypot was running an emulated copy of a web
server on the HIH honeypot. The HIH honeypot accepted redirected connections from
the honeynet gateway and allowed an attacker to interact with a non-emulated HTTP
server. Thus a more definite identification of malicious traffic was performed.
The honeywall was not present in this setup, because although it did provide a
convenient web interface, there was no ready-made command line utilities to extract the
tcpdumps from Honeywall databases. Instead a less scalable solution to capture traffic
directly to the packet capture (PCAP) files on the honeynet gateway was used.
3.3  Virtualization Setup Options
In the course of my project I used VMware ESX virtualization, because most of the
software supplied by the Honeynet project was not aware of virtualization, thus
requiring running of unmodified guest VMs. Although, Xen with Hardware-assisted
virtualization (HVM) support could be an alternative to VMware ESX, the Intel Xeon
processor I used did not support Intel-VT. Hence running unmodified guest VMs with
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Xen is not possible. UML Linux and Qemu were also not suitable either, because they
required modifications to the guest OS.
3.3.1  VMware ESX Configuration
Guest VMs for VMware ESX are available from VMware Marketplace, with a choice
of Debian 4.0 and Debian 5.0 images. By using those images and VMware Converter
the guest images can be transferred to the VMware ESX server. VMware ESX
networking is done with two switches, created via VMware Perl API scripts. The
default switch policies are appropriate. Figure 3 shows how the interconnections
between the switches and guest VM are done.
Figure 3. Honeynet networking in VMware ESX server
As Figure 3 demonstrates, the connections from LIH and HIH honeypots are restricted
and subject to policies applied on the honeynet gateway.
3.3.2  Setting Xen Virtualization
In contrast to the VMware ESX server, there are no precompiled images available for
Xen. However, using tools, such as xen-create-image, new Debian VMs can be installed
with minimal effort. For example, by issuing the following command several times,
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with bolded parameters modified, I created the necessary Xen Unprivileged Domain
(DomU) VMs:
$ xen-create-image –fs=ext3 –image=sparse –initrd=/boot/initrd.img-2.6.18-6-xen-686 –kernel
=/boot/vmlinuz-2.6.18-6-xen-686  --modules= /lib/modules/2.6.18-6-xen-686/k --memory=256Mb
–passwd –size=7Gb –swap=512Mb –dist=etch –mirror=http://ftp.fi.debian.org/debian/ --install-
method=debootstrap –gateway=192.168.59.254 –ip=192.168.59.10 –netmask=255.255.255.0 –
mac=00:16:3E:40:E8:FC –dir=/mnt/sdb3 –hostname=Honeypot
Once the Xen configuration file is created and DomU installations is complete, the Xen
VM can be launched with the command:
$ xen create –c /etc/xen/Honeypot.cfg
In comparison to the VMware ESX server, the option of creating switches and doing
similar networking setup in Xen is slightly more involved and requires a basic
understanding of Linux networking. Although Xen is currently limited to having three
switches only, this was sufficient for my setup.
3.4  Configuring Individual Honeynet Hosts
3.4.1  Low- and High-interaction HTTP Servers
First, I generated a self-signed SSL certificate to be used by the Apache HTTPS server,
as shown in Listing 1.
$ openssl genrsa -out server.key 1024
$ openssl req -new -key server.key -out server.csr
$ openssl x509 -req -days 365 -in server.csr -signkey server.key -out server.crt
        Listing 1. Genrating SSL certificates
The Apache 1.3.23 and OpeSSL0.9.6c are compiled from source and installed on the
Debian 3.1 host. The only needed change to enable HTTPS support in the Apache
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server, once the mod_ssl module was set up, was to modify the SSLCertificateFile and
SSLCertificateKeyFile declarations in httpd.conf file.
The HoneyWeb, emulating the LIH HTTP server, used the default configuration. Since
the stunnel emulation of the HTTPS protocol on the LIH failed, I used the proxy option
of Honeyd to redirect all HTTPS connections to HIH [35]. Listing 2 illustrates the
configuration used for Honeyd.
create linux
set linux personality "Linux 2.3.12"
set linux default tcp action reset
add linux tcp port 80 "/usr/bin/python HoneyWeb-0.4.py Apache loopback.com 80 $ipsrc"
add linux tcp port 443 "proxy 192.168.59.102:443"
set linux uptime 3284460
bind 192.168.59.31 linux
        Listing 2. Honeyd configuration file
The major obstacle for not using stunnel and running HTTPS locally on LIH is a bug in
Honeyd, which prevents the Honeyd daemon from running as a privileged user and
causes privileges to be dropped to the user ‘nobody’. When this occurs, the stunnel
cannot get access to SSL keys and other related files that are not world-readable, thus
failing to start the SSL daemon.
The Honeyd daemon was listening for incoming connections on a pseudo-interface and
a corresponding static IP address created on the LIH host. Thus to make the Honeyd
accessible to external clients, I added an explicit entry on the default gateway,
specifying that the static Honeyd IP was accessible via the physical interface of the host
running the LIH.
3.4.2  Honeynet Gateway Setup
The honeynet gateway has two functions: redirecting traffic between LIH and HIH
honeypots and running Snort IDS with an empty rule set, which will be populated after
new signatures are created. The traffic redirection is done using the tools provided by
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the Honeybrid project [36]. The relevant extract of the Honeybrid configuration is
shown in Listing 3.
target {
        filter "dst host 192.168.59.101 and port 443";
        frontend 192.168.59.101 "yesno";
        backend 192.168.59.102 "hash";
}
        Listing 3. Honeybrid configuration extract
As can be seen from Listing 3, the Honeybrid filter rule has the Pcap-like syntax for
accepting packets only for LIH honeypot, 192.168.59.101 on port 443. The frontend
rule states that all the packets should be accepted for inspection by LIH, while the
backend rule declares that only packets with a unique hash of payload should be
redirected to the HIH honeypot. The hash rule was not effective in my setup, because all
the traffic passing to the HIH honeypot was encrypted. Thus Honeybrid could see only
unique encrypted packet payloads. However, I still use this rule, because of its
efficiency for testing.
Overall, in the case of HTTPS protocol, the honeybrid operates in the following
manner:
1. SYN packet is received by the Honeybrid and forwarded to both LIH and HIH
honeypots.
2. Single SYN-ACK packet is sent in response to the external client.
3. The external client completes the TCP handshake by replying with ACK and
sends a packet with ‘Client Hello’ as required by SSL/TLS protocol.
4. Honeybrid receives the ‘Client Hello’ packet and computes a hash on the TCP
payload,  since  the  ‘Client  Hello’contains  random  bytes  sent  to  an  SSL  server,
the result is a unique packet, which is then forwarded to the HIH.
5. The RST packet is sent to the LIH to cause the LIH connection state to be
cleared.
6. Further connections of the external client take place with the HIH only.
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The resulting SSL session proceeded without interruption from the client point of view
and the web page of the HIH honeypot was displayed to the external client, connecting
to the honeynet with the address of the LIH.
The iptables configuration of the honeynet gateway, as required by the Honeybrid setup,
consisted of two components: network address translation (NAT) and rules causing
traffic to be directed to user space for processing and decision making. The complete
iptables settings for Honeybrid are shown in Listing 4.
iptables -A PREROUTING -d 192.168.59.96/29 -j DNAT --to-destination 192.168.59.101
iptables -I FORWARD -d 192.168.59.101-j QUEUE //Incoming attack traffic
iptables -I FORWARD -s 192.168.59.101 -j QUEUE //Traffic outgoing from LIH
iptables -I FORWARD -s 192.168.59.102 -j QUEUE //Traffic outgoing from HIH
        Listing 4. Firewall configuration of honeynet gateway
As presented in Listing 4, all traffic directed to 192.168.59.96 subnet was sent to the
LIH host. The NAT rule acted to prevent external connections to be directly made to the
HIH honeypot. The latter statements in Listing 4 indicate that both incoming and
outgoing traffic was sent to Honeybrid application for inspection.
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Snort IDS 2.8.5 is set up on the honeynet gateway. The main function of the Snort IDS
in this project was to verify that a particular signature was functioning as expected. The
Snort IDS can be located on any remote host and is placed on the honeynet gateway
only for convenience. Listing 5 demonstrates parameters specified in snort.conf file.
var HOME_NET [192.168.59.0/32]
var EXTERNAL_NET !$HOME_NET
var HTTP_SERVERS any
var HTTP_PORTS [80,443]
var SHELLCODE_PORTS !80
var RULE_PATH /etc/snort/rules
preprocessor frag3_global:        max_frags 65536
preprocessor frag3_engine:       policy linux \
                                                   bind_to any \
                                                   detect_anomalies
preprocessor stream5_global:    track_tcp yes
preprocessor stream5_tcp:         policy linux, ports server
preprocessor stream5_udp:        ignore_any_rules
preprocessor http_inspect:        global \
                                                  iis_unicode_map unicode.map 1252
preprocessor http_inspect_server: server default  \
                                                   profile apache ports { 80 443 } \
                                                   oversize_dir_length 500 \
                                                   flow_depth -1
preprocessor ssl:                         ports { 443 }
include $RULE_PATH/myrule.rules
        Listing 5. Extract of Snort IDS configuration file
Listing 5 shows EXTRNAL_NET to be set for networks, other than the HOME_NET.
Here I assumed that an attack on the honeynet would originate from networks, other
than the ones where the honeynet resided. A fragmentation preprocessor, frag3, also
needed to be configured as attack packets could be fragmented and pass undetected by
existing Snort rules. Stream5 preporcessor was necessary to enable TCP and UDP
connection tracking. Thus a direction of traffic flow could be specified in Snort rules.
HTTP preprocessors were used to provide appropriate HTTP decoding and analysis for
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the Snort IDS. The SSL preprocessor was used to detect attacks during SSL handshake
phase, unfortunately SSLv2, exploited by the Linux Slapper worm, was not supported in
the current Snort IDS release.
3.4.3  Setting Covert Monitoring
The compilation of Sebek client required installing Linux kernel headers and obtaining
Linux kernel source code. The filter.txt of Sebek client was set to capture all traffic on
port 443 and also all the keystokes executed by the user 'nobody', which is the user that
is running an unprivileged Apache server and this is the identity obtained by an attacker
once the OpenSSL vulnerability is exploited.
I compiled from source and installed Sebekd 3.0.3,  the covert monitoring server, on the
honeynet gateway. The Sebek server captured packets sent by the Sebek client, residing
on the HIH honeypot. Although the honeywall developed by the Honeynet project
provides a possibility for storing Sebek packets in the MySQL database, I chose to store
Sebek server data in plain text files.
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3.5  Verifying Honeynet Settings with Nmap
The honeynet scanning from anexternal network and detection of honeypots with Nmap
is difficult, because of Honeybrid system not accepting packets containing bad
checksums or a non-standard combination of TCP flags. Using the Nmap SYN scan
with version detection I obtained the results shown in Listing 6.
$ nmap –sS –PN –n –vv –reason –A –T4 –p80,443 192.168.59.102 192.168.59.101
Interesting ports on 192.168.59.101:
PORT    STATE    SERVICE  REASON      VERSION
80/tcp     filtered    http             no-response
443/tcp    open       ssl/http   syn-ack Apache httpd 1.3.23 ((Unix) mod_ssl/2.8.6 OpenSSL/0.9.6c)
Interesting ports on 192.168.59.102:
PORT    STATE    SERVICE    REASON      VERSION
80/tcp    filtered     http               no-response
443/tcp   open        ssl/https?      syn-ack
        Listing 6. Nmap scanning of Honeynet via Honeybrid
Because of filtering rules implemented by Honeybrid, all packets were accepted by
Honeyd host, while only unique packets were directed to the HIH honeypot. This
explains the incomplete version detection on port 443/tcp of 192.168.59.102, the HIH
honeypot. Port 80/tcp appeared to be filtered, because the present Honeybrid 0.9 Beta
version is limited to the support of only one port for replay and redirection.
During the next step I performed Nmap scanning without the Honeybrid present with
the goal of detecting network-level differences between HIH  and LIH honeypots. Using
different TCP flags combinations for scanning and by sending packets with bad
checksums I was not able to solicit a response that would distinguish HIH and LIH
services. Listing 7 depicts the Nmap scans I attempted against the honeypots.
$ nmap –scanflags SRF -sV -A -T4 -n -vv -PN –p80,443 –send-ip 192.168.59.96/29
$ nmap -sS –badsum -sV -A -T4 -n -vv -PN –p80,443 –send-ip 192.168.59.96/29
        Listing 7. Attempted honeypot detection with Nmap
35
3.6   Study of Apache Worm
3.6.1  Debugging Apache HTTP Server and SSL Plugin
OpenSSL debugging is a challenge because there is no process that is running an SSL
library on its own. Instead OpenSSL is usually a part of an application using the SSL
protocol. Fortunately, there are two standard utilities supplied by the library that can be
used for debugging: s_client and s_server. Using s_server emulation of a basic SSL-
enabled web-server is also possible. Listing 8 depicts a setup of a sample SSLv2 session
alongside with the output of s_client.
$openssl s_server -accept 443 -cert server.crt -key server.key -debug -state -msg -ssl2 -WWW
$ openssl s_client -connect 192.168.59.102:443 -msg -ssl2
>>> SSL 2.0 [length 002b], CLIENT-HELLO
<<< SSL 2.0 [length 0365], SERVER-HELLO
>>> SSL 2.0 [length 0092], CLIENT-MASTER-KEY
>>> SSL 2.0 [length 0011], CLIENT-FINISHED
<<< SSL 2.0 [length 0011], SERVER-VERIFY
<<< SSL 2.0 [length 0011], SERVER-FINISHED
SSL-Session:
    Protocol  : SSLv2
    Cipher    : DES-CBC3-MD5
    Session-ID: 881FA7D91....
        Listing 8. SSLv2 session handshake
As can be seen from Listing 8, initially a negotiation of cipher suites between the client
and the server takes place during client and server hello messages. Sending of the
CLIENT-MASTER-KEY serves establishing a common session key between a client
and server to be used for encryption and decryption.
The Apache HTTP server debugging is challenging with Apache 1.3.23 version,
because running Apache in a single mode is not available. I was able to compile Apache
with debugging symbols successfully and execute the HTTP daemon with Valgrind’s
massif, the heap profiler. An extract of the results obtained from running the heap
profiler during normal HTTPS session is shown in Listing 9; the heap snapshot belongs
to the Apache HTTPS child process.
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$valgrind –tool=massif ./httpd -f /usr/local/apache/conf/httpd.conf –DSSL
Heap allocation functions accounted for 81.6% of measured spacetime
Called from:
  31.0% : 0x80E0F98: CRYPTO_malloc (mem.c:215)
  16.1% : 0x807C6AB: malloc_block (alloc.c:253)
   9.5% : 0x80A318A: ap_hook_create (in /root/apache_1.3.23/src/httpd)
   5.5% : 0x80E102F: CRYPTO_realloc (mem.c:231)
Listing 9. Heap allocation profile of Apache HTTPS daemon
As seen from Listing 9, the heap is being actively used by the HTTPS daemon, with
CRYPTO_malloc function of the OpenSSL library occupying the largest portion of the
heap. The CRYPTO_malloc call is a wrapper for Glibc’s malloc function.  Executing an
exploit of theHTTPS daemon running with Valgrind heap profiler failed. Therefore my
observed results of the heap allocation during exploitation were the same as for a non-
exploited HTTPS session.
One of the important features that allow the shellcode execution to succeed is memory
allocation process, performed by the Apache web-server. Being a process-oriented
server and with the server spool exhausted, Apache 1.3.23 HTTPS server allocates
memory for the vulnerable SSL_SESSION structure in the same memory region for two
consecutive SSL connections, thus allowing an attacker to reuse the offsets leaked
during the first handshake.
I wanted to verify that memory addresses for SSL_SESSION structure are indeed the
same for two independent, consecutive connections. Thus I modified
modules/ssl/ssl_engine_kernel.c file of mod_ssl module, as shown in Listing 10, to print
out the memory address each time a block for SSL_SESSION was allocated.
/* This callback function is executed by OpenSSL whenever a new SSL_SESSION is
added to the internal OpenSSL session cache. */
int ssl_callback_NewSessionCacheEntry(SSL *ssl, SSL_SESSION *pNew)
{
…
ssl_log(s,SSL_LOG_INFO,"SSL_SESSION=%d",pNew);
Listing 10. Modified SSL_SESSION handler
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After recompiling Apache and mod_ssl server I was able to see that the connections
established to the HTTPS server had the SSL_SESSION structure situated in the same
memory address.
3.6.2  Understanding Shellcode Used
For simplicity I took only a short extract of the shellcode present in the exploit. In the
case of the Linux Slapper worm, the execution of setresuid() call is used for obtaining
root privileges for the bash shell, although unsuccessfully since Apache is usually
running as an unprivileged process. This brief study provides a good illustration of the
methods used by shellcode writers.
The default code of a setrestuid() call that is generated by GCC 4.3.3 has the structure
shown in Listing 11.
8048241: c7 44 24 08 00 00 00
 8048249: c7 44 24 04 00 00 00
 8048251: c7 04 24 00 00 00 00
 8048258: e8 c3 64 00 00
movl   $0x0,0x8(%esp)
movl   $0x0,0x4(%esp)
movl   $0x0,(%esp)
call   804e720 <__setresuid>
       Listing 11. A setresuid() call Assembly and hexdump
The Assembly code in Listing 11 shows three zeros pushed to the stack, before the
setresuid() subroutine is called. However, such code is not suitable for injecting into
vulnerable buffers, because of zeros used to terminate strings and contained in the hex
dump of this code. Knowing how a system call is made in Linux: load EAX register
with a syscall number, use EBX, ECX and EDX to pass arguments for a syscall and
issue int 0x80 software interrupt to switch from protected level 3 to kernel level 0, and a
code shown in Listing 12 is produced.
80483a5: bb 00 00 00 00 mov    $0x0,%ebx
 80483aa: b9 00 00 00 00 mov    $0x0,%ecx
 80483af: ba 00 00 00 00 mov    $0x0,%edx
 80483b4: b8 a4 00 00 00 mov    $0xa4,%eax
 80483b9: cd 80 int       $0x80
       Listing 12. Handwritten Assembly setresuid() syscall
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The code in Listing 12 is more straightforward, but has the same issue with NULL
bytes, as extract in Listing 11. The zeros of the MOV to EAX instruction occur from the
system being 32-bit, while only an 8-bit move is performed. By addressing only lower
bytes of the EAX register, the unneeded zeros are removed. A well-known workaround
for initializing registers with zeros is to use the XOR instruction leading to the final
version presented in Listing 13.
80483a5: 31 db xor    %ebx,%ebx
 80483a7: 31 c9 xor    %ecx,%ecx
 80483a9: 31 d2 xor    %edx,%edx
 80483ab: b0 a4 mov    $0xa4,%al
 80483b0: cd 80 int      $0x80
       Listing 13. Version of shellcode without zeros in the hex dump
Listing 14 is a shellcode version of the same setresuid() syscall that was used by a worm
itself.
31 c9 xor  %ecx,%ecx
f7 e1 mul  %ecx,%eax
51 push  %ecx
5b pop  %ebx
b0 a4 mov  $0xa4,%al
cd 80 int    $0x80
             Listing 14. Shellcode used by the worm
As shown in Listing 10, first, the ECX is cleared, then a multiplication of two 32-bit
numbers takes place, thus the high-order bits of the result are placed in EDX, while the
low-order bits are stored in EAX, and thus both registers contain zeros. PUSH and POP
are executed to avoid zeros in the hex dump and initialize the EBX. Finally, a syscall
interrupt takes place.
3.6.3  Preparing Exploit Code
For the purposes of testing my honeynet I did not use the actual Linux slapper worm,
but instead the exploit code that was made specifically to perform the targeted exploits
of Apache HTTPS servers. Thus I was able to verify a successful worm infection much
more quickly, than in the case of using the sequential scanning worm, and without a risk
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of the worm causing damage to external networks. The exploit code mimics the
behaviour of a worm, except for the creation of a control Peer-to-Peer (P2P) network.
The worm is working by exploiting heap overflow of the OpenSSL library before 0.9.7e
that allows writing to any memory location with four bytes of arbitrary data. To make
the exploit work, there also needs to be an appropriate version of the Glibc library
installed. However, this requires running Debian 3.1, because later releases of Debian
rely on the updated Glibc library patched against attacks on the unlink macro, and there
are no easily available mechanisms for the rollback of the Glibc package.
Understanding the exploit code requires a basic knowledge of the Executable and
Linking Format (ELF) format. Every ELF file consists of sections. For example .text
section is used for storing the read-only program code in the memory, while .data
section contains the variables initialized in the program. There is also a .got section,
standing for Global Offset Table (GOT) providing reference to external shared libraries
where most of the basic functions reside. By making use of the heap overflow and
unlink macro feature of Glibc 2.3.2, the exploit is overwriting the initial address of
free() function in the GOT table of the httpd ELF binary, and therefore the control flow
is redirected to the shellcode.
For the exploit to work, it needs to know the address of thefree() function in the httpd
binary. Listing 15 shows how the GOT section and the address of free() syscall are
obtained.
$ objdump -R /usr/local/apache/bin/httpd | grep free
DYNAMIC RELOCATION RECORDS
OFFSET   TYPE              VALUE
…
08177598 R_386_JUMP_SLOT   free
       Listing 15. GOT table and free() address of httpd binary
The command in Listing 15 is used to display the dynamic relocation entries of a file.
The address of the GOT table is stored in the EBX register; thus the number produced
40
by the objdump command represents the offset into the GOT to reach a certain function.
Once this offset is found, it will simply be added to the array of the known offsets in the
exploit.
3.6.4  Web-server Exploitation Technique
For executing the worm I used the code found on an Internet website of bugtraq.c file.
The source code for this worm has become available because of the error made by the
author: the malicious code compiling and executing a worm instance on an infected host
did not delete the source code after compilation. The particular worm sample I used
contained all the original elements of P2P networking and scanning for vulnerable
hosts. However, upon a discovery of a vulnerable host, the program simply terminates
without exploitation taking place.
The User Datagram Protocol (UDP) P2P network is using port 2002 on an infected
computer, providing a backdoor into the compromised system. The UDP packets are not
being encrypted, but the reliability of the UDP connection is being ensured by the use of
checksums and acknowledgments. Using the worm client program it is possible to direct
Denial of Service (DoS) attacks on other hosts by creating UDP or TCP floods of
requests. I verified this functionality, although with a small number of hosts there can
be no DoS attack, as each infected host sends one connection request.
Interestingly, although there is potential for a worm to coordinate scanning with other
worm instances, based on the overlay UDP network, the worm instances do not appear
to synchronize scanning results. The scanning is based on randomly chosen targets,
using the set of precompiled first octets, random selection of the second octet and
scanning the remaining octets sequentially.
During my experiments with the worm, I was not able to perform targeted infection of a
particular host, although properties of several worm commands remain obscure to me.
The UDP packets exchanged by UDP peers do not contain American Standard Code for
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Information Interchange (ASCII) characters, complicating the creation of signatures for
this worm, without understanding worm internals. In the laboratory environment I
launched the worm and observed scanning being performed. The average rate, SYN
packets, of worm scanning for potential victims is 32 connections per second.
3.6.5  Heap Overflow – Low Level Perspective
The Linux Slapper worm used a two-stage approach for attacking a victim HTTPS
server. During the first stage, by means of a heap overflow, the SSL_SESSION
structure information is being overwritten, causing the server to leak the values of
internal SSL-related structures of the server. During the second stage, another heap
overflow takes place and the previously leaked server-side SSL structures are reinserted
into the server. Additionally, by using the leaked addresses an attacker obtains a reliable
reference for shellcode location. Finally, an attack on Glibc takes place, modifying
internal heap structures and causing the GOT entry of free() syscall being overwritten
with an address of the shellcode. Once this is accomplished, a client asks a server to free
the SSL_SESSION structure, by closing the connection, and the execution control will
be transferred to the shellcode supplied by an attacker. [37]
On the network level, the first heap overflow is caused by a Client Master Key packet
with a key argument field employed for overflowing the vulnerable server-side buffer.
Figure 4 illustrates the malicious packet sent by a client.
Figure 4. Hex dump extract of the first overflow packet
As can be seen in Figure 4, initially a padding of 52B consisting of the ‘A’ symbol is
inserted to represent the Client Master Key, while the last four-bytes 0x70 or 112B set
the new size of session information length, causing additional and normally hidden data
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to be leaked to a client. Having obtained the needed offsets, an attacker creates a second
SSL connection, reinserting previously leaked values and injecting the shellcode. Figure
5 shows the contents of the second packet, also sent as Client Master Key.
Figure 5. Hex dump extract of the second packet
In Figure 5, the 0x0816D168, underlined in green, is the leaked address of server-side
SSL structure during the first overflow. The 0x0817758C, underlined in red, is the
address of GOT entry of free() syscall minus 12B, which is obtained by fingerprinting a
vulnerable server. The 0x081D8850 is an address where the shellcode is located, and
this is the value with which the GOT entry of free() is overwritten. The 0x081D8850
should be obtained from the second leaked value from the server-side SSL structure, but
the second leaked value is not seen in this packet.
Once the exploit has succeeded, the shellcode will locate the necessary file descriptor of
the attacker’s connection on the server-side. Finally, the attacker spawns a shell, reusing
the connection established by the exploit, with the packet sending done in clear text.
The bash shell spawning packet is shown in Figure 6.
Figure 6. Spawning Bash shell on exploited host
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A result of the packet in Figure 6 sent by an attacker is a shell for the user nobody, a
user that usually has the privilege of running the Apache server.
3.7  IDS Signature Generation
The overall process of extracting signatures from traffic directed to the HIH honeypot
and captured by the honeynet gateway consists of the following steps:
1. extract keystrokes logs from Sebek-server daemon running on honeynet gateway
2. parse relevant traffic capture and locate packets corresponding to keystrokes
executed on HIH honeypot
3. place the payload hex dump of packets containing Sebek keystrokes into an IDS
signature.
The script for producing signatures, included in Appendix 1, is intended to be run after
the necessary Sebek logs and Pcap files have been collected. The Sebek log parsing
consists of extracting the keystrokes logged and constructing an ASCII string that can
be later looked up from the Pcap files. Next, assuming that every command is separated
by a semicolon, I proceeded to look for substrings of the complete keystrokes’ string
within the Pcap file to obtain timestamps of relevant packets. Once this was
accomplished, I used the Pcap file timestamps to retrieve the corresponding packets and
extract the hex dump for signatures. This two-step approach was needed, because of the
parsing process being implemented without knowing how to extract proper fields of a
TCP packet using Perl. This was an inflexible solution, but served as a proof of the
concept.
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3.7.1  Capturing Traffic Traces
The tcpdump tool is capturing packets directed to the HIH honeypot, although the
Net::Pcap library can be used for scripting the process of capturing. The command line
is used for simplicity:
$ tcpdump -i eth0 -s 1500 -w honeynet_capture.pcap host 192.168.59.70 and tcp port 443,
where 192.168.59.102 is the address of HIH honeypot.
Once the capturing is completed, there will be a need to eliminate any unneeded
packets, for example TCP control packets or encrypted sessions from the captured file
to allow the resulting hex dump to be placed into a signature. Eliminating TCP control
packets can be done using a statement such as:
$ tcpdump -p -Xnr  honeynet_capture.pcap 'tcp[tcpflags] & (tcp-syn|tcp-fin|tcp-ack) == 0' |
tcdump -p -r - -w no_tcp_control_pkts.pcap
Later the result can be parsed with ssldump, used to identify SSL sessions and print
them out:
$ ssldump -Xnr no_tcp_contr.pcap
However, this solution was not suitable for my purposes, because it produced encrypted
packets only, while I needed the unencrypted hex dump. Because there was no tool to
compute the difference of two Pcap files, I had to use another approach, this time with
the tshark tool. I relied on the feature of tshark to accept the same filtering parameters as
Wireshark. Thus if I needed to look for an SSL session and print hex dump, I would
state:
$ tshark -xR ssl -r  honeynet_capture.pcap
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By manipulating the output of the tshark command I was able to obtain the necessary
hex dump to be inserted into an IDS signature.
3.7.2  Existing Signature in Snort IDS Ruleset
An interesting aspect of the Apache SSL exploit allowing to make effective network
IDS signatures is that the exploit code is being transmitted in clear text before a secure
connection is established. The current Snort IDS rule aimed at capturing the Linux
Slapper exploit contains the statement shown in Listing 16.
alert tcp $EXTERNAL_NET any -> $HTTP_SERVERS 443 (msg:"MISC OpenSSL
Worm traffic"; flow:to_server,established; content:"TERM=xterm"; nocase; reference:url
,www.cert.org/advisories/CA-2002-27.html; classtype:web-application-attack; sid:1887;
rev:3;)
       Listing 16. Snort IDS rule for Linux Slapper worm
The Snort rule, shown in Listing 16, relies on detecting “TERM=xterm” string within
the packet payload. During my experiments I confirmed that this rule was effective, as
this packet occurred immediately after the successful exploit. I also measured the
processing time of the original Snort IDS signature, using a simple Perl script, shown in
Appendix 2, to record time with nanosecond precision.  The time needed for Snort IDS
to successfully process the Pcap file and detect an attack, using only the Linux Slapper
worm signature was 0.389992 seconds, based on an average of 20 runs.
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4  Results
During my experiments I verified that Apache 1.3.23 with mod_ssl 2.8.6 and OpenSSL
0.9.6c, running on Debian 3.1 with Glibc 2.3.2 was vulnerable to Linux Slapper worm
infection. A successful exploitation provided an attacker with a shell access of the user
‘nobody’ to an affected host. Such privileges were sufficient for worm propagation and
creation of the overlay P2P network, although sensitive information such as SSL private
keys were not compromised.
The output of a signature generation script showed only the byte sequence to be added
to a Snort IDS signature. A complete version of Snort IDS signature, based on the script
output, is shown in Listing 17.
alert tcp $EXTERNAL_NET any -> $HTTP_SERVERS 443 (msg:"Attack detected";
flow:to_server,established;
content:"|5445524d3d787465726d3b20657865632062617368202d690a0a|";
sid:1000010;)
       Listing 17. Snort IDS signature produced by honeynet
In Listing 17, all elements of the signature, except for the byte sequence, were a
signature template and existed across all signatures. The time of Snort IDS processing
this signature was 0.392276 seconds, compared with the original Snort signature time of
0.389992 seconds. The produced signature was almost a hexadecimal representation of
ASCII keystrokes, thus the usefulness of the result is minimized. Based on my
algorithm for signature generation I also obtained two extra byte sequences for other
parts of keystrokes string. However, I did not use those strings in my performance
evaluation.
The redirection process provided by Honeybrid is not effective, because of the majority
of exploit traffic being encrypted, meaning that all the connection load is handled by the
HIH honeypot and is not shared across LIH and HIH honeypots. On the other hand,
redirection performed by Honeybrid is transparent and cannot be noticed by an attacker.
Unfortunately, the present release of Honeybrid is limited to supporting only one LIH
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and one HIH honeypot; thus scalability of this solution can be an issue. The Sebek
covert data collection was successful and provided sufficient information on the
attacker’s activity, although, due to difficulties with Sebek compilation, for platforms
other than Debian 3.1 and Debian 4.0, the application of Sebek service was limited.
I also observed that without the signature an attack would pass undetected by Snort IDS.
This situation was improved with the introduction of the SSL pre-processor in the Snort
IDS, although the exploit operates with SSLv2, that is not supported by the current
release of Snort IDS. An alternative to making an IDS application-aware is having
honeypots or end-user systems to supply IDS context information and thus generic
detection solutions can be developed.
At the moment considerably more effort is spent on developing an automated signature
generation algorithm. The attractiveness of obtaining such a solution is minimized, if an
exploit analyst can understand the workings of a network protocol and use the relatively
simple syntax of Snort IDS rules to create new policies based on a sample of malicious
traffic. However, such procedure can only be performed after the vulnerable hosts are
infected and honeypots can provide a certain time benefit for reacting to new threats.
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5  Discussion
The signature algorithm that I chose to use in this project is restricted to the Apache
SSL exploit and does not provide a generic solution for making NIDS signatures from
network traffic. While knowledge of exploit internal functioning is required for making
an IDS signature, this also means that an algorithm for signature generation is
customized to suit the needs of a particular exploit. It is also not practical to obtain a
single solution for all network protocols, but by analyzing more exploits of a specific
protocol, a more generic and robust solution could be implemented.
During my work I dealt with a worm, that neither actively attempted to hide itself, nor
used polymorphism to avoid being detected by NIDS systems. Fortunately, the worm
had exploited a heap overflow of a victim host, using SSL protocol, and did not attempt
to use encryption for communication at a later stage.
The implementation of the honeynet system showed that the information about activity
on HIH honeypots, in response to traffic seen by NIDS is valuable. Without such
information an attack can be detected only by IDS knowing the protocol structure and
constraints, monitoring inconsistencies in the connection state or observing the
connection rate. Using IDS to simply match traffic patterns is not an efficient method of
using IDS resources, as the functionality provided by an IDS is more granular. The
detection can also be based on a string offset inside a packet or TCP flags and options
used by an attacker. Such information is readily available to my honeynet system.
However, I did not implement these options.
The honeywall system did not prove useful in the honeynet, because of my
concentration on a non-self-propagating code. Additionally, the command line interface
for retrieving tcpdumps was not available, which significantly reduced the benefits of
running a honeywall in my setup. I was not able to use honeywall with Xen either,
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because of the needed modification to the kernel and the need to recreate all software
packages and configurations manually after kernel modifications.
While LIH honeypots are able to emulate only a small portion of the properties
available on a HIH HTTP server, it is sufficient for an automated system, because
scanners used in present worms do not usually distinguish minor fingerprint differences.
With this honeynet system not targeting a determined human attacker, such an approach
should be sufficient.
The study showed that a more versatile interface for reading Pcap files is also required.
In particular the functionality that is being already implemented with Wireshark
dissectors in GUI, such as identifying different sections of payload and protocol stack,
needs to be transferred to console applications such as tshark. One of the issues causing
my signature-generating solution to be non-generic, is the reliance on fixed offsets into
a packet where the needed information resides. By being able to extract an exact portion
of the packet payload, such as SSLv2 Client Hello message hexdump, there is a
possibility to produce more efficient signatures.
Ideally, a honeynet should not only attract an attacker, but also provide means for
analyzing malicious activity by collecting malware samples being uploaded to
honeypots. In a fully automated system the collected malware samples should later be
executed and monitored. One of the challenges of such design is establishing a secure
communication channel from HIH honeypots to the analysis server, since an analysis of
malware samples locally on the HIH creates a risk of the HIH being detected.
For the purposes of covert monitoring, there is more development potential in working
with open-source hypervisors, then with closed-source ones. One advantage is a
prospect to modify hypervisor source code to implement interception of guest VM
system calls in the virtualization layer. Not only will such monitoring be more covert,
but also provide methods for dumping affected memory regions and sharing complete
status information with the malware analysis service. An implementation of the external
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guest VM management system in the case of VMware ESX server requires building
additional infrastructure that imposes an unnecessary overhead for a small-scale project.
However, in case of Xen the needed interfaces are readily available and require less
configuration effort.
Another difficulty for automated honeynet development is detecting a moment when a
honeypot is infected and needs to be removed from a honeynet for re-initializing. This is
a particularly sensitive area for automation. A person monitoring a honeynet will be
able to identify when an attack is over or no additional information is required.
However, making such a decision by honeynet itself requires either implementing
certain heuristics or reliance on a fixed time interval. A need for maintaining long-term
images of honeypots may arise during multiple stage attacks when a worm is updating a
copy of itself or downloading additional attack tools.
While choosing a particular exploit to use for this project I was surprised by the
complexity and multitude of conditions that needed to be satisfied for creating a
vulnerable setup. Establishing such honeypot environments requires relevant knowledge
of the particular application and plugins, as is the case with recent Apache, Tomcat and
cross-site scripting exploits. Additionally, implementing LIH honeypots by writing
service scripts for such systems is not practical. One of the insights into this challenge is
creating LIH honeypots from a Pcap traffic capture of a particular protocol.
Exploit writing, IDS systems and honeypots require an intersection of skills not only in
computer networks, but also largely in software development. Because the goal of a
defence tool, such as honeynet, is to provide security proactively, by knowing about
probable errors in the software development process, a defence system can be targeted
more accurately and have improved detection rates. Moreover, the choice of protocols
to be used on HIH honeypots needs to be consistent and reflect the security needs of an
organization.
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6  Conclusion
In this project a semi-automated system for identifying malware samples for the
purposes of creating network IDS signatures was implemented. Additionally, a study of
the Apache HTTPS worm was undertaken. Using the knowledge of the Apache HTTPS
worm techniques, I created IDS signatures, based on the honeynet system, providing
reliable application layer information to inform about the threat of the traffic seen by the
IDS as an encrypted SSL session. Thus the goals of the project were achieved.
Although, the developed system is not suitable for use in production environments, my
experiment provides an insight into the operation of defence and attack methods. The
produced results also identify a lack of effective covert monitoring embedded into the
virtualization layer and ineffectiveness of command-line traffic analysis tools to provide
an interface for accessing the packet structure. The major disadvantage of this study is
concentration on a single case-specific exploit and therefore the selected method has
only limited application potential.
Recommendations for further study may include a closer look at the internal functioning
of the CPU and corresponding virtualization implications, as well as an examination of
malware classes and formulation of the formal rules for worm propagation. Such a
study could result in the formulation of novel models in malware detection, because
fewer layers of abstraction can help in finding more efficient and obvious similarities to
be used for IDS signatures.
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Appendix 1: Script for Extracting Hex Dumps from Pcap File
#!/usr/bin/perl
my $pcapfile="capture.pcap";
my $sebek_log="sebek_log.txt";
my %header;
my @res=();
my $string;
my $bytes;
# Parse the Sebek log here
# Assuming Sebek has the form, ex:
# [1269619236.199631  type=(sys_read) ip=(192.168.59.102) pid=(741:776) command=(sh)
#uid=(65534) inode=(0) fd=(0) len=(1)]e
{ my $cmd="cat $sebek_log | grep \"len=(1)\" | sed 's/.*\]//'";
my @out=`$cmd`;
foreach my $char (@out) {
$string .= $char;
chomp($string);
}
print $string . "\n"; }
# Process semicolon separated fields of the string one by one
# Assuming the attack string is similar to:
# TERM=xterm;exportTERM=xterm;...
my $i=1;
while ($i < 9) {
        my $cmd="echo -n \'$string\' | awk -F \";\" \'{print \$$i}\'";
        my @out=`$cmd`;
        chomp(@out);
        # Ask tshark to only show packets, which payload contains one of
        # the words from the attack string
        my $tshark="tshark -x -r $pcapfile -t e -R \'tcp contains \"@out\"\'";
        my @tout=`$tshark`;
        # Get the timestamps of the suspicious packets
        foreach my $line (@tout) {
                if ($line =~ m/TCP/) {
                        my $cmd="echo -n \'$line\' | awk \'{print \$2}\'";
                        my $output=`$cmd`;
push @res,$output;
                        print $output;
                }
        }
        $i++;
 }
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Appendix 1: Script for Extracting Hex Dumps from Pcap File
foreach my $time (@res) {
chomp($time);
my $t="tshark -x -r $pcapfile -t e | grep -A 9 $time | grep -v $time | sed 's/[0-9][0-9][0-
9][0-9]\\s\\s//' | awk -F \" \" '{\$17=\"\"; print}' | awk -F \" \" '{\$17=\"\"; print}' | sed 's/exec//' | sed
's/\\s//g'";
my @out=`$t`;
foreach my $l (@out) {
$bytes .= $l;
chomp($bytes);
}
# Remove Ethernet + IP + TCP headers = 66B or 132 characters
my $sign=substr($bytes,132);
                 print "Signature:" . $sign . "\n";
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Appendix 2: Script for Measuring Snort IDS Signature Execution
Time
#!/usr/bin/perl
# Snort command to use
my $snort="snort -d -l /etc/snort/log -c /etc/snort/snort.conf -r ~/perl_test/new/capture.pcap";
my $date="date +%s.%N";
# Save output to a log file
open(LOG,">>snort_time.log");
my $t1=`$date`;
my @out=`$snort`;
my $t2=`$date`;
my $diff=$t2-$t1;
# Report the time difference
print LOG "$diff\n";
close LOG;
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